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THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR
PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE IN
ALASKA AFTER LEE HOUSTON &
ASSOCIATES, LTD. V RACINE
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent decision by the Alaska Supreme Court carries profound
implications for attorneys practicing in Alaska. On March 1, 1991, the
court issued its decision in Lee Houston & Associates, Ltd. v. Racine.'
This decision reflects a significant change in direction by the court with
respect to the issue of statutes of limitations applicable to claims of
professional malpractice. Previously, the court had treated such claims as
sounding essentially in tort and applied the two-year limitations period used
in negligence actions.2 The Lee Houston court overruled this line of cases
and applied the six-year limitations period applicable to actions on
contract.
3
This note will address the issues raised by the court's holding in Lee
Houston. As a means of sharpening its focus, the note will concentrate on
the issue of the appropriate statute of limitations for claims of legal
malpractice, using such claims as an exemplar of professional malpractice
claims generally. Courts have treated these claims analogously, and the
analysis, reasoning and language employed by courts in legal malpractice
cases are generally applicable to claims for other kinds of professional
malpractice. For example, although Lee Houston in~volved a claim of
malpractice against a real estate agent, the court analyzed precedent in all
Copyright © 1992 by Alaska Law Review
1. 806 P.2d 848 (1991).
2. The two-year statute of limitations for negligence actions is codified at Alaska
Statutes section 09.10.070.
3. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 855 (applying Alaska Statutes section 09.10.050).
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areas of professional malpractice and concluded by explicitly overruling a
case involving legal malpractice.4
Section II briefly discusses the growing significance of legal
malpractice. Section H describes how a tort/contract dichotomy has arisen
in professional malpractice jurisprudence, while Section IV examines this
dichotomy within the context of Alaska case law prior to Lee Houston.
Section V analyzes how Lee Houston resolves this dichotomy in favor of
applying the contract statute of limitations for professional malpractice
claims. This analysis reveals a strong basis for using the negligence statute
of limitations for malpractice claims, and suggests that the Alaska Supreme
Court erred in holding such claims subject to the limitations period
applicable to contract actions. Section VI discusses various legislative
attempts to resolve the tort/contract dichotomy, and Section VII offers a
proposal for legislative action in this area.
II. TIE GROWING SIGNIFICANCE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE
The last few decades have seen a sharp rise in claims of professional
malpractice against attorneys. According to one commentator, the decade
of the 1970s saw almost as many reported legal malpractice decisions as
had the entire previous history of American jurisprudence.5 The rise in the
number of claims has continued; as many claims were brought through the
first six years of the 1980s as had been brought throughout the 1970s.6
Another study concluded that by 1970, only one out of every forty
attorneys had been subject to a malpractice claim, but by 1980, one out of
every fourteen attorneys had submitted a claim to their malpractice
insurance carriers.7
One issue that has sparked considerable debate in the area of legal
malpractice has been the determination of the appropriate limitations period
to apply to such claims. This debate stems from the fact that the attorney-
client relationship is usually established by a contract for employment, yet
a claim for injury "resulting from the professional incompetence of an
4. Id.
5. RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFERY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 1.6, at 19 (3d
ed. 1989); see also Joseph H. Koffler, Legal Malpractice Statutes of Limitations: A Critical
Analysis of a Burgeoning Crisis, 20 AKRON L. REv. 209 (1986) (arguing that the sharp rise
in legal malpractice claims necessitates that courts develop rational and just rules for statutes
of limitations); Harry F. Mooney & Laurie Styka Bloom, Anatomy of a Legal Malpractice
Claim, 55 DEF. COUNSEL J. 400 (1988) (noting the rise of legal malpractice and the
associated rise in insurance premiums).
6. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 5, § 1.6, at 19.
7. Eugene D. Mossner, Legal Malpractice Insurance Trends -- The National and
Michigan Experience, 65 MrcH. B.J. 550, 551 (1986).
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attorney is actionable under theories which are an amalgam of both tort and
contract." The statute of limitations issue is critical for several reasons.
First, virtually all states apply a significantly longer limitations period for
contract actions than they do for traditional tort actions.9 In addition,
several commentators have noted that the statute of limitations is not only
the most successful defense in legal malpractice cases, but it is also often
the only viable affirmative defense available to the defendant.'0
The disagreement and confusion in this area is reflected by the only
two United States Supreme Court cases addressing the issue. In Wilcox v.
Executors of Plummer," the Supreme Court analyzed a legal malpractice
claim using language indicating that the Court was addressing the issue in
terms of breach of contract.12 However, forty-four years later, in Marsh
v. Whitmore,'3 the Court treated a similar malpractice claim under a
tort/negligence analysis. While these cases are instructive with respect to
the tort/contract dichotomy, it is important to note that they are not binding
upon any state court. Legal malpractice is a state law issue, and each state
remains free to select its own approach to the limitations period.
Im. THE TORT/CONTRACT DICHOTOMY IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE
JURISPRUDENCE
With slight variations, states have developed three general approaches
to determine the statute of limitations to be applied in actions for legal
malpractice. Several state courts have held that the statute of limitations
applicable to contract actions governs claims of malpractice. 4 Other state
courts have found such actions to sound in tort and have applied the
limitations period for traditional tortious negligence, at least where there
was no breach of any specific promise.15 In an attempt to resolve this
8. Jones v. Wadsworth, 791 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Alaska 1990); see also Long v. Buckley,629 P.2d 557, 561 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that legal malpractice usually consists
of both tort and breach of contract); see generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 92-94 (5th ed. 1984).
9. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.050 (1983) (providing six-year limitations period
for actions "upon a contract") and ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983) (providing two-year
limitations period for "any injury to the person or rights of another not arising on contract").
10. DAVID MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACrICE LAW & PROCEDURE § 5:1 (1980);
MALLEN & SMITrH, supra note 5, § 18.1; Kevin M. Downey, Comment, Winding Down the
Clock: The Statute of Limitations for Legal Malpractice in Pennsylvania, 94 DICK. L. REv.
131 (1989).
11. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172 (1830).
12. Id. at 181 ("When the attorney was chargeable with negligence or unskilfulness
[sic], his contract was violated...").
13. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 178 (1874).
14. See infra Section M.A.
15. See infra Section III.B. While these courts have recognized that a malpractice
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dichotomy between judicial approaches, a growing number of state
legislatures have enacted statutes explicitly detailing the limitations period
to be applied in malpractice cases.'
A. The Rationale For Applying The Contract Limitations Period To Legal
Malpractice Claims
Several appellate courts have treated legal malpractice claims as actions
for breach of contract. 7 The reasoning of the Virginia Supreme Court in
Oleyar v. Kerr8 is illustrative of the rationale supporting this approach.
Oleyar involved a claim of malpractice against an attorney in the
performance of a title search pursuant to an oral contract for the attorney's
services. While recognizing that a case for the negligent performance of
professional services by an attorney sounded in tort, the court noted that no
duty would have been owed by the defendant/attorney to the plaintiff in the
absence of the employment contract.'9 The court maintained that the
action was "grounded upon and [had] its inception in the contractual
relationship brought about by the oral agreement." 2
claim based on a breach of the duty of due care sounds in tort, most have held that where
an attorney breaches a specific and explicit contractual agreement, an action may be
maintained for breach of contract. See, e.g., Sincox v. Blackwell, 525 F. Supp. 96 (W.D.
La. 1981). Examples might include situations in which an attorney explicitly agreed to
represent a party at a hearing and failed to appear or explicitly agreed to file a complaint
by a certain date and failed to do so. Of course, the most obvious example would be where
the attorney and the client entered into a contract and the attorney failed to provide any
services whatsoever.
16. See infra Section VI.
17. See, e.g., Neel v. Magana, 491 P.2d 421,422-23 (Cal. 1971) (noting that attorney's
failure to exercise requisite skill, prudence and diligence constitutes breach of an "implied
term" of attorney-client contract and applying statute covering actions upon "contract,
obligation or liability"); Benard v. Walkup, 77 Cal. Rptr. 544, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)
(holding that attorney "impliedly contracted to exercise degree of care, skill and knowledge"
required by negligence standard); Loftin v. Brown, 346 S.E.2d 114, 116 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that legal malpractice is based on breach of duty imposed by attorney/client
contract and is subject to limitations period applied to breach of oral contract); Higa v.
Mirikitani, 517 P.2d 1, 5-6 (Haw. 1973) (applying statute covering actions upon a "contract,
obligation or liability" to legal malpractice claim); Church v. McBurney, 513 A.2d 22, 24-26
(R.L 1986) (applying catch-all statute of limitations in legal malpractice case after finding
breach of contractual duty "intrinsic to the attorney client relationship"); Schirmer v.
Nethercutt, 288 P. 265, 268 (Wash. 1930) (holding that legal malpractice claim is based on
breach of contract and controlled by statute of limitation relating to breach of contractual
relation).
18. 225 S.E.2d 398 (Va. 1976).
19. Id. at 399.
20. Id.
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The Virginia Supreme Court held that such an action was in essence
a claim for breach of contract, subject to the statute of limitations
applicable to contract actions rather than the period applicable to
negligence actions.2 The court based its decision on the following
distinction between actions sounding in tort and in contract:
If the cause of complaint be for an act of omission or non-feasance which,
without proof of a contract to do what was left undone, would not give rise
to any cause of action... then the action is founded upon contract, and
not upon tort. If, on the other hand, the relation of the plaintiff and the
defendants be such that a duty arises from that relationship, irrespective of
contract, to take due care, and the defendants are negligent, then the action
is one of tort.'
Thus, the court concluded that an action for legal malpractice, though
sounding in negligence, was governed by the limitations period applicable
to contract actions because the rendering of such services originates from
a contractual relationship.'s
B. The Rationale For Applying The Tort Limitations Period To Legal
Malpractice Claims
Several jurisdictions have chosen the opposite path, concluding that
actions for legal malpractice are governed by the statute of limitations
applicable to traditional torts, at least in the absence of a claim of a breach
of a specific and explicit promise.24 Sincox v. Blackwell' illustrates the
21. Id. at 400.
22. Id. at 399-400 (citation omitted).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Yazzie v. Olney, Levy, Kaplan & Turner, 593 F.2d 100, 105 (9th Cir.
1979) (applying Arizona law and holding that statute of limitations for action upon written
contract does not apply to legal malpractice claim because claim was only indirectly
connected to the instrument); Thomas v. Howard, 455 F.2d 228, 229 (3rd Cir. 1972)
(applying New Jersey law and holding negligence limitations period applicable to claim that
attorney failed to represent client to best of ability); Moorehead v. Miller, 102 F.R.D. 834,
836 (D.V.I. 1984) (holding that claim for legal malpractice is governed by two-year general
tort statute in the absence of a claim based on the non-performance of a specific promise);
Keystone Distribution Park v. Kennerk, 461 N.E.2d 749, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that failure of attorney to perform pursuant to an oral contract constituted the tort of legal
malpractice not an action upon a contract); Chavez v. Saums, 571 P.2d 62, 65 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1977) (holding that "where a contractual relationship exists between persons and..
a duty is imposed by or arises out of the circumstances surrounding or attending the
transaction, the breach of the duty is a tort"); McNary v. Sidak, 478 So. 2d 712, 715 (La.
Ct. App. 1985) (holding that tort limitation period is applicable unless attorney breaches an
express warranty); Gabel v. Sandoval, 648 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
that legal malpractice is in the nature of a tort action, subject to the two-year tort limitations
period); Citizens State Bank v. Shapiro, 575 S.W.2d 375, 387-88 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)
(holding that actions for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against attorney sound in
tort for purposes of the statute of limitations); Hall v. Nichols, 400 S.E.2d 901, 904 (W. Va.
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rationale for treating claims of legal malpractice as torts for statute of
limitations purposes. Sincox involved a claim for malpractice arising from
alleged omissions by the attorney during a criminal trial in which the
malpractice plaintiff was the defendant.2
The court noted that claims of legal malpractice could spawn actions
sounding in both contract and tort.' It held, however, that malpractice
claims stating an action upon contract were limited to situations involving
"specific result-oriented attorney/client contracts or those containing special
warranties or situations where the attorney has simply failed to perform,
which goes to the essence and existence of the contract.' ' 8 The court
found no implied warranties in the employment agreement between the
attorney and client sufficient to support a breach of contract action and held
that the claim was in essence that of negligence of a professional -- the
failure "'to exercise at least that degree of care, skill, and diligence which
is exercised by prudent practicing attorneys in [the] locality.' 29 Thus, the
court concluded that the limitations period for traditional torts was
applicable to the malpractice claim, and thus the plaintiff's claim was
barred.30
IV. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENTS IN ALASKA
The Alaska Supreme Court has also wrestled with this tort/contract
dichotomy with respect to the limitations period applicable to claims of
professional malpractice. Because this conflict provided the precedential
backdrop for the Lee Houston decision, an understanding of the reasoning
and analysis utilized by the court in earlier cases is essential in evaluating
Lee Houston.
The supreme court first addressed this statute of limitations issue in
Van Horn Lodge v. White.31 Van Horn Lodge involved a malpractice
1990) (ruling that essence of client's legal malpractice claim was breach of duty imposed
by law rather than by contract). For a discussion of contract actions for breach of explicit
promise, see supra note 15.
25. 525 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. La. 1981).
26. Id at 97. The alleged omission was the attorney's failure to object to the jury's
guilty verdict after one juror stated that he had "reasonable doubt" about his guilty vote.
Id.
27. Id. at 99 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 100 (citations omitted); see supra note 15.
29. Sincox, 525 F. Supp. at 100 (quoting Ramp v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 269
So. 2d 239, 244 (La. 1972)).
30. Id.
31. 627 P.2d 641 (Alaska 1981), overruled by Lee Houston & Assocs., Ltd. v. Racine,
806 P.2d 848 (Alaska 1991).
[Vol. 9:1
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
claim for an attorney's alleged failure to file an amended complaint in a
timely manner.32  At trial, the superior court held that the claim was
barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to actions sounding
in tort.33 On appeal, the plaintiff/client argued that since the action arose
out of a contractual relation with the attorney, the six-year limitations
period applicable to contract actions should govern.'
The supreme court affirmed the superior court's decision, holding that
because the claim sounded in tort, the two-year limitations period
applicable to tort actions controlled.35  After noting the absence of "an
agreement to obtain a particular result or to do a particular thing," the court
found that the contractual relationship merely gave rise to a general duty
to exercise due and reasonable care.36 In holding the tort limitations
period applicable to a claim of legal malpractice, the court reasoned "that
the essence of [the plaintiff's] complaint was negligence, and the gravamen
thereof lies in tort."'37
In Wettanen v. Cowper,"8 the Alaska Supreme Court was again
confronted with a claim of legal malpractice. The case arose from an
attorney's alleged failure to prepare for and attend trial. In Wettanen,
as in Van Horn Lodge, the plaintiff argued that the six-year contract
limitations period applied to legal malpractice claims.4 The court refused
to resolve the issue, ruling instead on the procedural ground that the
plaintiff had failed to argue at trial that the contract limitations period was
applicable.41 The court nevertheless indicated that it was amenable to a
re-evaluation of Van Horn Lodge at some point by recognizing the
plausibility of the plaintiff's argument that the attorney/client contract
32. Id. at 643.
33. Id.; see ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983) (providing that "[n]o person may bring
an action (1) ... for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising on contract.
unless commenced within two years").
34. Van Horn Lodge, 627 P.2d at 643; see ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.050 (1983)
(providing that "[n]o person may bring an action (1) upon a contract or liability, express or
implied ... unless commenced within six years").
35. Van Horn Lodge, 627 P.2d at 643.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also Greater Area, Inc. v. Bookman, 657 P.2d 828, 829 (Alaska 1982)
(following Van Horn Lodge and applying six-year limitations period to claim of legal
malpractice).
38. 749 P.2d 362 (Alaska 1988).
39. Id. at 363-64.
40. Id. at 364.
41. Id. The court stated that "[a]rguments not raised in the trial court are waived and
will not be considered on appeal." Id. (citing Miller v. Sears, 636 P.2d 1183 (Alaska
1981)).
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contained an implied agreement "to do a particular thing -- namely, to
prepare for and attend trial." 42
In Thomas v. Cleary,43 however, the supreme court again applied the
"gravamen" approach of Van Horn Lodge, finding that a claim of
malpractice based on an accountant's failure to file and pay the plaintiff's
taxes sounded essentially in tort, making it subject to the two-year tort
limitations period.44 In Thomas, the court enumerated the elements of a
cause of action for professional malpractice: "(1) a duty, (2) a breach of
that duty, (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct
and the resulting injury, and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the
professional's negligence."45 These are the basic elements of any claim
sounding in negligence.
The supreme court confronted the issue of a breach of an explicit
promise by an attorney in Jones v. Wadsworth.46 Jones involved a claim
against an attorney stemming from the breach of alleged specific oral
agreements to handle the case "expeditiously" and keep the client
informed.47 Citing cases applying contract statutes of limitations to
breaches of specific promises or undertakings,48 the court held that the
six-year limitations period applicable to contract actions governed the
claim.49 While expressly limiting its holding to cases involving the
"nonperformance of a specific promise contained in an express
contract,"50 the court openly questioned the validity of Van Horn Lodge
and suggested that all legal malpractice claims, whether sounding in tort or
contract, should be governed by a single limitations period.5'
Bibo v. Jeffrey's Restaurant2 is another instance in which the
supreme court reached a decision calling the validity of Van Horn Lodge
into question.53 Bibo involved the analogous issue of breach of fiduciary
42. Id.
43. 768 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1989).
44. Id. at 1092 n.6.
45. Id. at 1092 (citations omitted).
46. 791 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1990).
47. Id. at 1014.
48. See supra notes 15 & 24.
49. Jones, 791 P.2d at 1015-16; see ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983).
50. Jones, 791 P.2d at 1017.
51. Id.
52. 770 P.2d 290 (Alaska 1989).
53. The opinion in Bibo did not address Van Horn Lodge or its progeny. However, in
Lee Houston & Associates, Ltd v. Racine, the supreme court argued that the breach of duty
in Bibo was analogous to the malpractice claim in Van Horn Lodge, stating that "[b]oth
cases involved alleged professional incompetence. In neither case was it alleged that the
defendant promised (expressly or impliedly) to do a particular thing and then failed to
perform." Lee Houston, 806 P.2d 848, 853 (Alaska 1991). The court added that both cases
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duties owed to a corporation by its directors. The court found the breach
of fiduciary duty action to be based on an implied contract to "honestly and
diligently direct the business of the corporation."M  Thus, the court
concluded that "[a]ctions against corporate directors for breach of fiduciary
duty sound in contract, and are governed by the six-year statute.""5
Against this legal backdrop, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed the
issue of the limitations period to be applied to claims of professional
malpractice in Lee Houston & Associates, Ltd v. Racine
56
V. LEE HOUSTON & ASSOCIATES, LTD. V. RACINE
A. The Facts of Lee Houston
Lee Houston involved claims against a real estate agent for negligence,
misrepresentation, fraud and breach of a professional contract of
employment.57 The claims arose from the following factual scenario: the
plaintiff, Racine, entered into a listing agreement with the realtor, Lee
Houston, to sell property owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff accepted an
offer for the property worth $355,000, consisting of $100,000 cash and a
$255,000 promissory note secured by a third mortgage on property owned
by the prospective purchaser. 8 The complaint alleged that the real estate
agent explained to the plaintiff that the offer represented "an exceptional
deal" because the plaintiff was to receive a third mortgage on property
worth over $600,000, with only $70,000 to $80,000 in debt superior to
hers. A little more than a year after the closing, the purchaser ceased
making payments on the promissory note. It was then discovered that the
plaintiff had in fact received a sixth mortgage, with over $400,000 in
indebtedness superior to her claims.59
The trial court directed a verdict for the realtor on the claims of
negligence, misrepresentation and fraud, ruling that the claims were barred
by Alaska's two-year statute of limitations governing tort actions.6 The
"dealt with a professional's alleged breach of due care which was implied by law as a result
of a contractual undertaking." Id. The Lee Houston court concluded that the "substantial
irreconcilability" of Bibo and Van Horn Lodge demonstrated the need to re-examine the
relationship between tort and contract in malpractice claims. Id. at 853-54.
54. Bibo, 770 P.2d at 295.
55. Id. at 296.
56. 806 P.2d 848 (Alaska 1991).
57. Id. at 850.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 851; see ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983).
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court did submit the breach of contract claim to the jury, which returned
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. From this verdict, the realtor
appealed.6
1
B. The Holding of the Alaska Supreme Court
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict, holding that the
claim for breach of contract was timely, having been brought within the
six-year limitations period applicable to contract actions.62 Though the
court noted that there was no allegation of a breach of a specific promise,
the court found that the contract between the parties created fiduciary
duties that were subsequently breached. 63  Citing Bibo v. Jeffrey's
Restaurant,4 the court held that the language of the two-year statute of
limitations, which covers actions for "any injury to the person or rights of
another not arising on contract,"65 did not govern since the action did in
part "arise" from the contract.6 The court explicitly overruled Van Horn
Lodge v. White67 and concluded that the action, "whether regarded as an
action upon a fiduciary duty arising from the agreement or as professional
malpractice," was subject to the six-year limitations period for an action
upon a "contract or liability."69
C. Analysis of the Supreme Court's Decision
The Lee Houston court, though citing Bibo, did not explicitly hold that
a professional malpractice action could be based on a breach of an implied
contract to exercise due diligence. The court instead analyzed the language
of the applicable statutes of limitations and concluded that the two-year
limitations period, covering actions "for any injury to the person or rights
61. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 851.
62. Id. at 852; see ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.050 (1983).
63. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 854.
64. 770 P.2d 290 (Alaska 1989); see supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
65. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983) (emphasis added).
66. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 854.
67. 627 P.2d 641 (Alaska 1981), overruled by Lee Houston & Assocs., Ltd. v. Racine,
806 P.2d 848 (Alaska 1991).
68. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 852.
69. Id. at 855. After concluding that Alaska Statutes section 09.10.070 did not apply
to the claim since the claim did "in part arise from the contract," the court found that the
broad language of Alaska Statutes section 09.10.050 (action upon "contract or liability")
governed. Id..at 854. The court appears to suggest that, where more than one statute could
reasonably apply, section 09.10.050 is to be treated as the default statute.
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of another not arising on contract,"'7 did not govern actions where the
duty allegedly breached in part arises from a contract.71 The court further
noted that the language of the six-year statute of limitations, covering
actions "upon a contract or liability, express or implied,"72 must be
interpreted as applying to a "category of actions broader than those based
only on contract principles."73
In reaching this conclusion, the court appears to suggest that all torts
arising in part out of a contractual relationship are to be governed by the
six-year limitations period. In so doing, the court has abandoned the
previously well-settled rule in Alaska that the two-year limitations statute
applies to traditional tortious negligence actions, while the six-year
limitations period applies to actions for breach of contract! 4
1. The Elements of Professional Malpractice Are Compatible with Tort,
not Contract, Liability. For statute of limitations purposes, it is the general
rule that "the nature or substance of the cause of action, rather than the
form of action," is the test to determine what statute of limitations applies
and whether the action is barred by the running of the limitations period."
The Alaska Supreme Court recognized this general rule in Van Horn Lodge
when it looked beyond the niceties of the pleading and searched for the
"gravamen" of the complaint.76 The Lee Houston decision, in contrast,
falls to give sufficient weight to the true nature and substance of a claim
for malpractice -- the negligent and tortious performance or
nonperformance of professional services.'
70. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983) (emphasis added).
71. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 854.
72. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.050 (1983) (emphasis added).
73. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 854; see also Jones v. Wadsworth, 791 P.2d 1013, 1018
n.2 (Alaska 1990) (Moore, J., dissenting) (discussing majority's indication that it might be
willing to apply the six-year contract limitations period to all cases arising out of contractual
relationships and stating that the dissenter is "unwilling to overrule a line of cases dating
to the earliest years of this court in order to reach that result").
74. See Jones, 791 P.2d at 1015 (phrasing issue as whether claim is "'action upon a
contract' governed by the six year statute of limitations ... or is an action in tort...
governed by the two year limitations period" (footnote omitted)); Bibo v. Jeffrey's
Restaurant, 770 P.2d 290, 295-96 (Alaska 1989) (analyzing whether breach of fiduciary duty
claim is governed by "implied contract" or "tort" limitations statute); Thomas v. Cleary, 768
P.2d 1090, 1092 n.6 (Alaska 1989) (holding that attorney malpractice actions are "torts" for
statute of limitations purposes); Van Horn Lodge v. White, 627 P.2d 641,643 (Alaska 1981)
(noting that action "sounding in tort" is governed by two-year statute), overruled by Lee
Houston & Assocs., Ltd. v. Racine, 806 P.2d 848 (Alaska 1991).
75. See Koehring Co. v. National Automatic Tool Co., 257 F. Supp. 282,292 (S.D. Ind.
1966) (applying Indiana law); Morgan v. Baldwin, 450 N.W.2d 783, 785 (S.D. 1990).
76. Van Horn Lodge, 627 P.2d at 643.
77. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictions that treat
malpractice claims as torts).
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
As recently as 1989, the Alaska Supreme Court applied the elements
of a traditional negligence case in an action for professional malpractice."
In Van Horn Lodge, the supreme court determined that the duty imposed
is simply "a duty of reasonable care .... The contract only gave rise to the
duty . . ,7" This line of reasoning was abandoned in Lee Houston.
Other jurisdictions have likewise recognized that the elements of a
malpractice claim merely restate the elements of the traditional tort of
negligence."m An attorney's breach of an implied warranty to exercise due
care constitutes "'in effect, the negligence of a professional -- that act or
omission which is below the standards of similar practitioners in the
community.'
8 1
Professional liability arises from a fiduciary duty owed by professionals
to their clients. This duty requires the professional to act in the client's
best interests. In the context of the legal profession, an attorney is "bound
'to exercise at least that degree of care, skill, and diligence which is
exercised by prudent practicing attorneys in his locality."' 82  The
application of this broad duty more closely resembles the paradigm of tort
liability for breach of the duty of due care than the paradigm of contract
liability for breach of individually negotiated promises. As Justice Burke
noted in his Lee Houston dissent, "[t]he claim arises from the defendants'
breach of duties imposed upon him regardless of the parties' intent when
the listing agreement was made; like the ordinary tort feasor's duty of
reasonable care, these were duties imposed by the laws of society."8 3
Breaches of these duties by professionals should be treated in the same
78. Thomas, 768 P.2d at 1092 (citations omitted); see supra text accompanying note 45.
79. Van Horn Lodge, 627 P.2d at 643.
80. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Pavlikowski, 581 P.2d 851, 853 (Nev. 1978) (elements of
legal malpractice are: (1) duty of professional to exercise such skill, prudence and diligence
as other members of profession commonly exercise and possess, (2) breach of duty, (3)
proximate causal connection between breach and injury, and (4) actual loss or damage);
Vollgraff v. Block, 458 N.Y.S.2d 437, 438 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (elements are: (1)
negligence of the attorney, (2) negligence was proximate cause of loss sustained, and (3)
proof of actual damages); see also Mooney & Bloom, supra note 5, at 400 (elements of
legal malpractice claim are existence of relationship creating duty, breach of duty, proximate
cause and damages).
81. Sincox v. Blackwell, 525 F. Supp. 96, 100 (W.D. La. 1981) (quoting Corceller v.
Brooks, 347 So. 2d 274, 277 (La. Ct. App. 1977)); see also Benard v. Walkup, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 544, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that attorney is bound "to exercise a degree
of care, skill and knowledge which would be required by the negligence standard"); Loftin
v. Brown, 346 S.E.2d 114, 116 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (action for legal malpractice not suit
on contract but rather suit based on tort of negligence); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104(a)(2)
(Supp. 1991) (classifying actions against attorneys for malpractice as "personal tort actions"
for statute of limitations purposes); Mooney & Bloom, supra note 5, at 400 (elements of
legal malpractice claim constitute "garden-variety negligence" claim).
82. Sincox, 525 F. Supp. at 100 (quoting Ramp v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 269
So. 2d 239, 244 (La. 1972)).
83. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 857 (Burke, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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manner as all other breaches of the duty of due care, and should thus be
subject to the two-year tort statute of limitations.
2. Policy Considerations Do Not Support Application of the Six-Year
Limitations Period. The Lee Houston court offered several policy
rationales in support of its application of the contract limitations period.
First, the court stressed the need for uniformity in this area of law, stating
that it "should avoid applications of the law which lead to different
substantive results based upon distinctions having their source solely in the
niceties of pleading and not in the underlying realities."'  The court
further stated that defenses based on statutes of limitations are "generally
disfavored by the courts.""5 Thus, the court concluded that "doubts as to
which of two statutes is applicable . . . should be resolved in favor of
applying the statute containing the longer limitations period. ' 6
While the court's desire for uniformity is sensible, the general
preference for the application of longer statutes of limitations should apply
only to cases where it is truly questionable which statute is appropriate; it
does not support the court's disregard for the nature and substance of a
claim for legal malpractice. The court's skepticism regarding the validity
of defenses based on the statute of limitations underestimates the crucial
role that these periods play in the litigation process. Contrary to the
supreme court's assertion, other courts have recognized that such periods
of limitations "are founded upon .. . sound public policy, and are,
therefore, favored by the courts." 7 Indeed, in Cameron v. State,88 the
Alaska Supreme Court itself recognized the legitimacy of a statute of
limitations defense, stating that statutes of limitations "'avoid the injustice
which may result from the prosecution of stale claims ... [and] protect
84. Id. at 853.
85. Id. at 854. The rationale behind this disfavor is a fairness concern for prospective
plaintiffs who might lose their right to sue. However, Alaska's adoption of the discovery
rule has significantly limited the validity of this rationale. See infra notes 106-12 and
accompanying text. The Alaska discovery rule states that the limitations period "does not
begin to run until the claimant discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the
existence of all elements essential to the cause of action." Cameron v. State, 822 P.2d
1362, 1365 (Alaska 1991) (citing Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopters Int'l, 694 P.2d 143, 144
(Alaska 1984)). Commentators have noted that the length of the statutory period, even if
brief in duration, is rarely a problem where a viable discovery rule is in place. See, e.g.,
MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 5, § 18.1, at 67.
86. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 855 (citing Bibo v. Jeffrey's Restaurant, 770 P.2d 290
(Alaska 1989)).
87. Cordial v. Grimm, 346 N.E.2d 266, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976), overruled on other
grounds by Shideler v. Dwyer, 417 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. 1981); see also Morgan v. Baldwin,
450 N.W.2d 783, 785-86 (S.D. 1990) (stating that "a statute of limitations defense is a
meritorious defense which should not be regarded with disfavor and which should be treated
like any other defense").
88. 822 P.2d 1362 (Alaska 1991).
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against the difficulties caused by lost evidence, faded memories and
disappearing witnesses."'89 In Lee Houston, the court suggested that the
application of the six-year limitations period was consistent with these
purposes. 9° The court noted that claims involving economic loss, such as
the one involved in Lee Houston, are often based on documentary evidence
rather than "unaided recollections which quickly grow stale."I Yet the
decision does not recognize that claims based on negligence and breach of
the duty of due care, even if they are claims involving economic loss, are
"likely to depend on disputed facts," while actions on express contractual
duties "are less likely to depend upon testimonial evidence that quickly
grows stale."
92
As an illustration of this principle, a recent study has indicated that as
many as forty percent or more of legal malpractice claims stem from
situations involving the following: procrastination on the part of the
attorney, planning errors, inadequate discovery or investigation, conflicts
of interest, failure to follow the client's instructions or failure to properly
understand or apply the law.93 Situations such as these are more likely
to be based on disputed facts than on documentary evidence. Such claims
raise the very evidentiary concerns which statutes of limitations are
designed to address. In fact, though Lee Houston itself involved a claim
of economic loss, the case turned on potentially stale testimonial evidence
relating to the representations made by the real estate agent. Finally, the
court also did not take into account that in an action upon a written
contract, the agreement itself is available to prove the substance of the
agreement, whereas such proof is not available in a malpractice claim
based on the breach of the duty of due care.
The court's reliance on the availability of documentary evidence in
claims involving economic loss' is likewise potentially misplaced, as it
is unclear whether the court would limit the application of the six-year
89. Id. at 1365 (quoting Haakanson v. Wakefield Seafoods, 600 P.2d 1087, 1090
(Alaska 1979)).
90. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 855 ("The statutes are intended to encourage prompt
prosecution of claims and thus avoid injustices which may result from lost evidence, faded
memories and disappearing witnesses." (citation omitted)); see Peter M. Casey, Case
Comment, Church v. McBurney, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 423, 424 n.10 (1987) (rationales
for statutes of limitations include fairness to defendants, preservation of evidence, protection
of business); see also supra text accompanying note 89.
91. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 855.
92. Jones v. Wadsworth, 791 P.2d 1013, 1018-19 (Alaska 1991) (Moore, J., dissenting).
93. STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LIAB., CHARACrEmsTics OF LEGAL
MALPRACTiCE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL MALPRACrICE DATA CENTER (1989); see
also Mooney & Bloom, supra note 5, at 403-06.
94. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 855.
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limitations period to actions for economic loss.95 The two-year limitations
period governs actions "for injury to the person or rights of another not
arising on contract." 6  The Lee Houston court explicitly reserved
judgment as to whether the phrase "not arising on contract" modifies
"injury to the person" as well as "rights of another."'97 If the phrase does
in fact modify "injury to the person," then claims for medical malpractice
would fall under the six-year limitations period as well.9"
The court also did not address the likely economic effects of its
holding. While the court's decision ostensibly aids consumers of legal
services by allowing malpractice claims to be brought after two years, it is
likely that these same consumers will bear significant costs. As the
potential for malpractice suits increases, insurance carriers will increase
their malpractice premiums. Of course, attorneys will duly pass these costs
on to their clients.
3. The Lee Houston Decision Creates the Potential for Anomalous
Results. Several possible anomalies may arise from Lee Houston ' holding.
For example, the court's holding that the two-year limitations period does
not apply to malpractice claims because such claims arise partly out of a
contractual relationship,99 indicates that malpractice claims which do not
involve contractual privity between the professional and the client could be
subject to the shorter two-year limitations period. Examples of such
situations include local counsel employed by another law firm rather than
the client, medical personnel who are consulted in the treatment of a
patient by the patient's doctor, and engineers and other professionals
employed through subcontracting relationships with architects.'
Another potential anomaly resulting from the court's decision involves
the issue of damages. The plaintiff in Lee Houston sought punitive
damages, as well as direct and consequential damages 0'' The court
recognized that "'[p]unitive damages are not recoverable for breach of
95. See id. at 854.
96. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983).
97. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 854 n.12.
98. But see Cameron v. State, 822 P.2d 1362 (Alaska 1991); Pedersen v. Zielski, 822
P.2d 903 (Alaska 1991). Both cases applied the two-year limitations period to medical
malpractice claims, but in neither case did the plaintiff argue that the longer period should
apply. Thus, the court was not forced to address the issue.
99. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 854.
100. The current limitations period applicable to malpractice claims in the construction
fields is unclear because Alaska Statutes section 09.10.055, which provides a six-year
limitations period for actions claiming deficiencies in the design, planning, supervision or
observation of construction projects, was held unconstitutional as violative of equal
protection. See Turner Constr. v. Scales, 752 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1988).
101. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 855-56.
19921
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
contract unless the conduct constituting the breach constitutes an
independent tort.""'  While not resolving the question, the court termed
the determinative issue as "whether [the plaintiff's] hybrid action is a 'tort'
for purposes of determining the availability of punitive damages."'03
Thus, it appears that the court would allow recovery of punitive damages
if the breach constituted an independent tort, despite the fact that the two-
year limitations period applicable to traditional torts had run.'
14
Yet another anomalous aspect of the court's opinion concerns the
court's adoption of the "discovery rule,"1"5 which holds that the
limitations period does not begin to run until "'a reasonable person [in like
circumstances would have] enough information to alert that person that he
or she has a potential cause of action or should begin an inquiry to protect
his or her rights."" 6  Courts have generally applied the "occurrence"
rule1' 7 to claims based on contract, whereby the statute begins to run
immediately upon the occurrence of the breach. Notably, in Howarth v.
First National Bank,'08 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the statute of
limitations begins to run in a contract action at the time the right to
maintain an action accrues, noting that this usually occurs at the time of
breach.1 9 In contrast, the "discovery" rule has generally been applied
102. Id. at 856 (quoting ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Alaska
1988)).
103. Id.
104. But see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., Inc., 372 N.E.2d 555, 559 (N.Y.
1977) (holding that damages in malpractice action brought after tort limitations period had
run should be limited to those damages recoverable for breach of contract).
105. For a general discussion of the approaches to accrual rules, see Koffler, supra note
5, at 213-26; Downey, supra note 10, at 136-44; Moorehead v. Miller, 102 F.R.D. 834, 837
(D.V.I. 1984).
Three general approaches have been utilized. Some courts have applied the
"occurrence" rule, whereby the statute runs upon the occurrence of the essential facts
constituting the cause of action, regardless of the discovery by the potential plaintiff.
Wilcox v. Ex'rs of Plummer, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 172 (1830). Other courts have applied the
"damage" rule, whereby the statute runs from the time the potential plaintiff suffers injury.
This rule reflects a recognition of the tortious nature of the claim, and thus requires proof
of injury. Fort Myers Seafood Packers v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir.
1967). The final approach is the "discovery" rule, whereby the statute runs once the
potential plaintiff knows, or reasonably should know, of the essential facts giving rise to the
claim. See, e.g., Budd v. Nixen, 491 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1971).
106. Lee Houston, 806 P.2d at 851-52 (quoting Mine Safety Appliance v. Stiles, 756
P.2d 288, 291 (Alaska 1988)) (alteration in original); see also Greater Area, Inc. v.
Bookman, 657 P.2d 828, 829 (Alaska 1982) (applying discovery rule to legal malpractice
claim). For a further discussion of the "discovery rule" as applied by courts in Alaska, see
Cameron v. State, 822 P.2d 1362, 1365 (Alaska 1991).
107. See supra note 105.
108. 540 P.2d 486 (Alaska 1975), affd on reh'g, 551 P.2d 934 (Alaska 1976).
109. Id. at 490; see also Loftin v. Brown, 346 S.E.2d 114, 116 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that legal malpractice action against attorney for breach of contract accrues from
date of alleged negligent act).
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only to actions sounding in tort.'10 In Neel v. Magana,"' for example,
the California Supreme Court noted that the limitations period applicable
to a breach of contract action commences immediately upon the
commission of the acts constituting the breach, while an action for
negligence "does not accrue until the client discovers, or should discover,
the facts establishing the elements of his cause of action."' Lee
Houston indicates that the Alaska Supreme Court will apply a rule of
accrual inconsistent with its holding that actions for professional
malpractice claims are subject to the six-year contract limitations period.
VI. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE TORT/CONTRACT
DICHOTOMY
In recent years, a growing number of states have enacted statutes of
limitations explicitly covering malpractice actions."' With some
exceptions,"' the statutes offer the benefits of predictability and
consistency. These statutes generally take a somewhat restrictive approach
to malpractice claims, providing for limitations periods of shorter duration
than those applicable to contract actions."5
110. See, e.g., Greater Area, Inc. v. Bookman, 657 P.2d 828, 829 (Alaska 1982)
(applying discovery rule to claim of legal malpractice, noting that such claims sound in
tort); see also MEISELMAN, supra note 10, § 5:2 (1980); Casey, supra note 90, at 432 n.47
(discovery rule applies to actions in tort, but not in contract).
111. 491 P.2d 421 (Cal. 1971).
112. Id. at 433, quoted in Sorenson v. Pavlikowski, 581 P.2d 851, 853 (Nev. 1978).
113. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 340.6 (West 1991) (providing that "an action
against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission" must be commenced within one year
after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the facts constituting the
act or omission, or within four years of the alleged act, whichever comes first); FLA. STAT.
§ 95.11(4)(a) (1987) (providing that an action for professional malpractice other than
medical malpractice must be commenced within two years); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.5805(4) (West 1991) (providing for a two-year period of limitations for an action
charging malpractice; held applicable to legal malpractice claims in Sam v. Balardo, 270
N.W.2d 522 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 214 (McKinney 1991)
(providing that "an action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental
or podiatric malpractice" must be commenced within three years); Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.11 (Anderson 1991) (providing that an action for malpractice other than medical
malpractice shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (1991) (providing for a one-year limitation period for actions against
attorneys for malpractice, whether the actions are grounded in contract or tort).
114. See infra text accompanying notes 119-35; see also MALLEN & SMiTH, supra note
5, § 18.8, at 87-88 (stating that these statutes suffer from a "lack of specificity and
definition").
115. Compare, e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 214 (McKinney 1991) (providing three-
year statute of limitations for malpractice claims) with N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 213
(McKinney 1991) (providing six-year statute of limitations for actions on contract) and IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-4-19-1 (Bums 1991) (providing for two-year limitations period for claims
of malpractice) with IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-2-1 (Bums 1991) (providing for six-year
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
An analysis of the development of professional malpractice law in New
York provides insight into legislative response to the tort/contract dynamic.
The experience in New York also reveals the care which must be taken to
draft legislation broadly and carefully to ensure its uniform application in
all cases of professional malpractice." 6
The New York courts first addressed the limitations issue in Glens
Falls Insurance Co. v. Reynolds."7 In Glens Falls, the court held that
a claim for professional malpractice would be governed by the three-year
limitations period applicable to tortious negligence actions since there was
no explicit agreement to obtain a particular result."' Five years after
Glens Falls was decided, the New York Legislature enacted a statute
providing that actions "to recover damages for malpractice, other than
medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice" must be commenced within three
years. 119 For the next fifteen years, the courts of New York consistently
applied this three-year limitations period to legal malpractice actions in
which there were no allegations of a breach of an explicit promise. 20
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Associates,'2 1 however, the New
York Court of Appeals ignored the malpractice statute and held that the
six-year contract limitations period applied to a claim against an architect
for failure to exercise due care in the performance of contracted
services. " The court held that the proper consideration in determining
the applicable limitations period was the form of the remedy sought, not
the theory of liability."2 Since the plaintiff's claim was for damages to
pecuniary interest rather than for personal injuries, the court held that the
six-year contract limitations period applied. 24 The court noted that the
alleged liability "had its genesis in the contractual relationship of the
parties," and that "absent the contract between them, no services would
have been performed and thus there would have been no claims.'
While acknowledging the Legislature's "general address to malpractice
limitations period for suits upon oral contracts).
116. See infra Section VII.
117. 159 N.Y.S.2d 95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957).
118. Id. at 97; see also Registered County Homebuilders, Inc. v. Stebbins, 179 N.Y.S.2d
602 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) (holding that breach of an express promise to conduct title search
in a professional, skillful and workmanlike manner constituted an action on contract).
119. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 214(6) (McKinney 1991).
120. See, e.g., Troll v. Glantz, 293 N.Y.S.2d 345 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (holding that
complaint charging negligence, and not breach of a specific agreement, is subject to three-
year limitations period applicable to legal malpractice).
121. 372 N.E.2d 555 (N.Y. 1977).
122. Id. at 556-57.
123. Id. at 557.
124. Id. at 557-58.
125. Id. at 558.
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claims," 1 6 the court found that the claim was not governed by the three-
year malpractice limitations period 27 as that statute did not apply to
malpractice claims based on breach of contract.' 28
Five years after Sears, a New York court chose not to apply the Sears
rule to a case involving a claim for legal malpractice, and instead applied
the three-year malpractice limitations period. 29 However, in Video Corp.
of America v. Frederick Flatto Associates, 30 the New York Court of
Appeals, in a memorandum opinion, reaffirmed its holding in Sears that
"an action for failure to exercise due care in the performance of a contract
insofar as it seeks recovery for damages ... recoverable in a contract
action is governed by the six-year contract Statute of Limitations."''
Two cases following Video Corp. have applied the contract statute of
limitations to claims of legal malpractice. 32
At least one commentator has argued that the decisions in Sears and
Video Corp. are not necessarily inconsistent with the line of cases
developed from Glens Falls, since both Sears and Video Corp. involved the
breach of specific contractual promises. 33  More importantly, however,
the commentator argued that if Sears and Video Corp. have overruled the
Glens Falls line of cases, the New York Court of Appeals has effectively
repealed the three-year statute of limitations explicitly applicable to actions
for malpractice.' 34 Recent New York cases demonstrate the continuing
126. Id.
127. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L & R. § 214(6) (McKinney 1991).
128. Sears, 372 N.E.2d at 558. Apparently, the court drew a somewhat novel distinction
based on the nature of the injury between claims for malpractice, which would necessarily
be subject to the three-year limitations period, and a claim for breach of an implied
contractual duty to exercise due and reasonable care, which would allow the plaintiff the
benefit of the contract limitations period. See infra Section VII for a statutory proposal
which would eliminate this problem.
129. Vollgraff v. Block, 458 N.Y.S.2d 437, 439 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (returning to rule
of Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Reynolds by holding that breach of a specific promise is required
to maintain contract action for legal malpractice).
130. 448 N.E.2d 1350 (N.Y. 1983).
131. Id.
132. See Cohen v. Goodfriend, 665 F. Supp. 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Sinopoli v. Cocozza,
481 N.Y.S.2d 177 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
133. Thomas A. Leghorn, Legal Malpractice: Three-Year or Six-Year Statute of
Limitations, 6 N.Y. ST. BJ. 50 (Oct. 1990). This argument is based on the fact that both
cases involved not only breaches of an implied covenant of due diligence, but also breaches
of specific contractual warranties.
134. Id. at 51-52; see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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confusion in this area, 35 and illustrate the need for precision in drafting
a malpractice statute of limitations.
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATiVE ACTION
This note argues that the Alaska Supreme Court erred in applying the
six-year limitations period to claims for professional malpractice. The
court failed to give sufficient weight to the fact that such actions are
essentially actions for negligence. The evidentiary considerations in such
cases require the application of a shorter limitations period in order to meet
the goals of "avoid[ing] the injustice which may result from the
prosecution of stale claims... [and] protect[ing] against the difficulties
caused by lost evidence, faded memories, and disappearing witnesses."'3 6
In light of the court's decision in Lee Houston, it is incumbent upon the
Alaska Legislature to enact a statute of limitations explicitly applicable to
claims of professional malpractice that will return such claims to the
shorter limitations period appropriate for claims based on the breach of the
duty of due care.
In drafting a limitations statute applicable to professional malpractice,
the Legislature must take care to define clearly what claims will be
covered. The developments in New York are instructive in this regard.
Despite the existence of a statute explicitly providing that actions to
recover damages for non-medical malpractice must be commenced within
three years,' some New York cases allow plaintiffs to benefit from the
application of the longer contract limitations period for malpractice claims
based on a breach of an implied contract to exercise due care.' The
success of the New York courts in evading the intent of the statute
indicates that a malpractice limitations statute should be drafted to
comprehensively define those claims to which it is applicable. In addition,
a statute that defines malpractice to include all actions, whether arising in
135. Several departments of New York's Appellate Division have taken divergent views.
See Golub v. Baer, Marks & Upham, 567 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (failure to
use reasonable care in performing legal services provides basis for contract liability and six-
year period applies); Santulli v. Englert, Reilly & McHugh, 563 N.Y.S.2d 548 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990) (applying six-year limitations period, but holding that malpractice sounds in tort
absent express promise to obtain particular result); Pacesetter Communications Corp. v.
Solin & Breindel, 541 N.Y.S.2d 404 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (applying three-year limitations
period to malpractice claims and holding that breach of contract claim against attorney may
only be maintained only where attorney has breached an explicit promise to obtain a specific
result).
136. Cameron v. State, 822 P.2d 1362, 1365 (Alaska 1991) (quoting Haakanson v.
Wakefield Seafoods, 600 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Alaska 1979)).
137. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 214(6) (McKinney 1991).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 121-35.
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contract or in tort, would provide the uniformity and predictability the Lee
Houston court appropriately sought.
139
Because the nature of a professional malpractice claim is essentially
one of negligence,14U the limitations period itself should match the two-
year limitations period applicable to traditional tortious negligence actions
in Alaska.14' Further, considerations of fairness to prospective plaintiffs,
as well as the unique nature of the professional relationship, require the
application of the discovery rule. Since the plaintiff/client is generally a
non-expert placing his or her trust in the professional's expertise, the
limitations period should not begin to run until the client knows, or should
reasonably know, of the existence of the claim. 4
Several jurisdictions have also enacted statutes of repose under which
no claim may be brought after a certain time period, regardless of the
underlying limitations period and whether the claim was discoverable by
that time or not. 43 The rationale for these statutes, like that for statutes
of limitations, is grounded in the danger of stale claims and the loss of
evidence.'" The particular nature of professional malpractice requires
that care be taken in enacting such statutes of repose, as the facts
underlying such claims are often undiscoverable for a substantial period of
time. For example, faulty architectural or engineering work may not
manifest itself for a period of several years. Likewise, the facts giving rise
to legal malpractice may not be discoverable, or may not prove injurious,
until the particular case has completed its journey through the courts. 45
A period of ten years for such a statute of repose should strike an
appropriate balance between the fairness considerations to the plaintiff and
the dangers of stale claims and loss of evidence as time passes./46
With these considerations in mind, the following is offered as a
proposal for a comprehensive and equitable statute of limitations applicable
to claims for professional malpractice:
139. See supra text accompanying note 84.
140. See supra part V.C.1.
141. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983).
142. See Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Stiles, 756 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1988).
143. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-574 (1991) (providing that "in no event may the action
be commenced more than four years after such act or omission or failure").
144. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
145. See Leonard F. Amari, Call For 2-Year Statute of Limitation on Attorney
Malpractice, 78 ILL. B.J. 8 (Jan. 1990).
146. A potential danger of statutes of repose involves legal malpractice in the drafting
of a last will and testament. Since these actions are almost never discoverable until the
death of the client, such claims should be exempt from the statute of repose.
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(1) All actions for professional liability against a person or persons
whose occupation or trade requires certification by the state of
Alaska,". whether based upon negligence or breach of contract,
express or implied, shall be commenced within two years after the
act, omission, breach or failure giving rise to the claim; provided,
that if the facts essential to the cause of action are not discovered
and could not reasonably have been discovered in the exercise of
due and reasonable diligence at the time of the act, omission,
breach or failure giving rise to the claim, the action may be
commenced within two years of the time that the facts essential to
the cause of action are discovered, or should have been discovered
in the exercise of due and reasonable diligence.
(2) In no event shall a professional liability action against a person
or persons whose occupation or trade requires certification by the
state of Alaska, whether based upon negligence or breach of
contract, express or implied, be commenced more than ten years
after the act, omission, breach or failure giving rise to the claim;
except that a legal service liability action against a legal service
provider alleging negligence or breach of contract, express or
implied, in the drafting of a last will and testament, may in all
cases be commenced within two years of:
(a) the time that the facts essential to the cause of action are
discovered, or should have been discovered in the exercise of due
and reasonable care; or
(b) the death of the testator, whichever is earlier.'4 8
147. This statute encompasses actions for professional malpractice generally. Several
states have enacted statutes applicable only to claims of legal malpractice. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 6-5-574 (1991) (covering "[a]ll legal service liability actions against a legal service
provider").
Without attempting an in-depth analysis of legislative intent, several possible rationales
may be suggested for such periods of limitations. First, the provision of legal service is (at
least in some contexts) considered more fundamental in our society than the provision of
other professional services. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI. A related concern involves
the societal value of pro bono work, which might be discouraged in the absence of a short
limitations period. Finally, a cynic might suggest that such statutes are merely the product
of attorneys in the legislature protecting their own.
148. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 753-A (West 1991) (exempting claims
arising from "drafting of a last will and testament" from statute); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-
104 (1991) (covering actions "whether... grounded or based in contract or tort").
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The Alaska Supreme Court erred in holding that actions for
professional malpractice are subject to the six-year limitations period
applicable to actions for breach of contract. A professional malpractice
action is essentially one for the tort of negligence, and the two-year
limitations period applicable to actions for tortious negligence should
apply. In response to the supreme court's holding, it is incumbent upon the
Alaska Legislature to enact a statute of limitations explicitly governing
malpractice actions. Such a statute should return such actions to the shorter
limitations period applicable to negligence actions. A carefully drawn
statute would provide the benefits of predictability and uniformity, and in
conjunction with Alaska's discovery rule, would strike an appropriate
balance between the competing fairness considerations due professionals
and prospective claimants.
Scott Lawrence Altes

